This is output of the engine, not a mock-up.
It was made when this site was built, against a site its author runs. The PDF and the evidence file are published beside it.
Privacy assessment — audiolibri.org#
Page observed: https://audiolibri.org/
Scan reference: 1e9172c3a41c
Passive observation of the public page · 2026-11-16 04:22:58 UTC
B — conformant on the points observed
No finding of critical or high severity on the page observed.
On loading the page, with no interaction from the user, the site contacted 2 third parties, all of which process data outside the European Economic Area.
No cookie and no write to the terminal on first visit.
The overall outcome is B: 3 findings, of which 0 critical and 0 high.
| Severity | Findings |
|---|---|
| Critical | 0 |
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 1 |
| Informational | 2 |
Work by owner#
| Owner | Findings | of which serious | quick wins | Areas |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DPO / privacy | 2 | 0 | 0 | infrastructure, privacy-engineering, supply-chain |
| Security | 1 | 0 | 0 | application-security, supply-chain |
Findings in detail#
No Content-Security-Policy#
PM-SEC-03 · Low · P4 · Owner: Security · confidence: observed
No Content-Security-Policy is declared. Beyond the security angle, CSP is what makes the promise in the privacy notice verifiable: without explicit connect-src and script-src, any included script — even one introduced by mistake or by a supplier — can open a channel to an undeclared third party.
Legal references: GDPR Art. 32 — security of processing; GDPR Art. 25 — data protection by design and by default
Control mapping: GDPR: GDPR Art. 25 — data protection by design and by default, GDPR Art. 32 — security of processing · NIS2: NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 Art. 21(2)(e) — security in acquisition, development and maintenance, NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 Art. 21(2)(d) — supply chain security · ISO 27001: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.23 — web filtering, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.26 — application security requirements, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.28 — secure coding · SOC2: SOC 2 CC6.6 — logical access security measures against external threats, SOC 2 CC7.1 — detection of configuration changes and vulnerabilities
Evidence observed
- Report-only policy served (enforces nothing):
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-MGik3+GNup91ZWwmI0dkjMzUyWhqDx/D0JrQIHEnPOA=' 'sha256-yFwehGPXk8nzTLeHkzd0QTiwYo59le5Hiu9t4SqlJdc=' 'sha256-+IyAqQWbRS4+EWWlVg/ u7bHtojs1ponIRvS8G5NB0b8=' 'sha256-UjLs79H2dMN3rAe113FABrama8PSjQc5sOLH9/U/OoY=' 'sha256- Ey1Vit544AejKuLTkGh4Jw9rvKHr/OF/zCL
How to check this yourself
- Run:
curl -sSI https://audiolibri.org/. - Compare the headers present with those the finding expects (the complete list of observed headers is in the evidence).
- Every check must be done in a clean window: a pre-existing cookie or consent changes what the site does and makes the comparison meaningless.
Remediation — medium effort — Adopt a CSP that lists the permitted destinations explicitly.
- Start in observation only with
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Onlyand collect the violations. - Consolidate
default-src 'self'plus the destinations that are genuinely needed. - Move to enforcement; the policy then becomes the technical control that prevents undeclared transfers.
Technical provider outside the EEA: Cloudflare CDN / WAF (Cloudflare, Inc.)#
PM-TRF-02:cloudflare-cdn · Informational · P4 · Owner: DPO / privacy · confidence: observed
The service relies on Cloudflare CDN / WAF (Cloudflare, Inc., US), a provider needed to deliver the page: it requires no consent, but it remains a recipient of personal data outside the European Economic Area. This finding is informational and exists to keep the record of processing and the privacy notice aligned; it becomes a problem only if the provider is not declared or if the Art. 28 agreement is missing.
Legal references: GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) — recipients or categories of recipients; GDPR Art. 28 — processor; GDPR Arts. 44-49 — transfers of personal data to third countries
Control mapping: GDPR: GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) — recipients or categories of recipients, GDPR Art. 28 — processor, GDPR Arts. 44-49 — transfers of personal data to third countries · NIS2: NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 Art. 21(2)(d) — supply chain security · ISO 27001: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.19 — information security in supplier relationships, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.21 — managing information security in the ICT supply chain · ISO 27701: ISO/IEC 27701 7.2.6 — contracts with PII processors, ISO/IEC 27701 7.5.1 — identify basis for PII transfer between jurisdictions · SOC2: SOC 2 CC9.2 — vendor and business partner risk management
Evidence observed
- Detected via:
response header - Pages that contacted it:
https://audiolibri.org/- Transfer:
outside the EEA - Basis for the transfer:
EU–US Data Privacy Framework / Standard Contractual Clauses - Named in the document:
privacy
How to check this yourself
- Run:
curl -sSI https://audiolibri.org/and read the response headers. - The header that identifies the provider is reported in the evidence (
server,cf-ray,x-github-request-id, …). - Compare with the list of processors in the privacy notice.
- Check whether the provider is named in https://audiolibri.org/privacy.html (text search in the page).
- Every check must be done in a clean window: a pre-existing cookie or consent changes what the site does and makes the comparison meaningless.
Remediation — low effort — Necessary provider: nothing to remove, but it has to be declared.
- List Cloudflare, Inc. among the processors in the privacy notice, with the purpose it serves.
- State the transfer (outside the EEA) and the basis relied on, and keep a copy available.
- Confirm the processing agreement under Art. 28 is signed and current.
Technical provider outside the EEA: GitHub Pages (GitHub, Inc. (Microsoft))#
PM-TRF-02:github-pages · Informational · P4 · Owner: DPO / privacy · confidence: observed
The service relies on GitHub Pages (GitHub, Inc. (Microsoft), US), a provider needed to deliver the page: it requires no consent, but it remains a recipient of personal data outside the European Economic Area. This finding is informational and exists to keep the record of processing and the privacy notice aligned; it becomes a problem only if the provider is not declared or if the Art. 28 agreement is missing.
Legal references: GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) — recipients or categories of recipients; GDPR Art. 28 — processor; GDPR Arts. 44-49 — transfers of personal data to third countries
Control mapping: GDPR: GDPR Art. 13(1)(e) — recipients or categories of recipients, GDPR Art. 28 — processor, GDPR Arts. 44-49 — transfers of personal data to third countries · NIS2: NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 Art. 21(2)(d) — supply chain security · ISO 27001: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.19 — information security in supplier relationships, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.21 — managing information security in the ICT supply chain · ISO 27701: ISO/IEC 27701 7.2.6 — contracts with PII processors, ISO/IEC 27701 7.5.1 — identify basis for PII transfer between jurisdictions · SOC2: SOC 2 CC9.2 — vendor and business partner risk management
Evidence observed
- Detected via:
response header - Pages that contacted it:
https://audiolibri.org/- Transfer:
outside the EEA - Basis for the transfer:
EU–US Data Privacy Framework - Named in the document:
privacyaccessibility
How to check this yourself
- Run:
curl -sSI https://audiolibri.org/and read the response headers. - The header that identifies the provider is reported in the evidence (
server,cf-ray,x-github-request-id, …). - Compare with the list of processors in the privacy notice.
- Check whether the provider is named in https://audiolibri.org/privacy.html (text search in the page).
- Every check must be done in a clean window: a pre-existing cookie or consent changes what the site does and makes the comparison meaningless.
Remediation — low effort — Necessary provider: nothing to remove, but it has to be declared.
- List GitHub, Inc. (Microsoft) among the processors in the privacy notice, with the purpose it serves.
- State the transfer (outside the EEA) and the basis relied on, and keep a copy available.
- Confirm the processing agreement under Art. 28 is signed and current.
Recipients observed#
| Service | Legal entity | Juris. | Transfer | Consent | Declared |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare CDN / WAF | Cloudflare, Inc. | US | outside the EEA | strictly necessary | yes |
| GitHub Pages | GitHub, Inc. (Microsoft) | US | outside the EEA | strictly necessary | yes |
Pages observed#
Pages are chosen deterministically — one per kind, then a leaf page, then the main navigation — so two scans of the same site remain comparable. Links are followed from the entry page only: a conformance check is not a crawl.
| # | URL | Kind | Status | Requests |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://audiolibri.org/ | entry page | 200 | 100 |
| 2 | https://audiolibri.org/segnalazioni | form | — | 0 |
| 3 | https://audiolibri.org/chi-siamo | about | — | 0 |
Reproducibility#
This document can be derived again from scratch. The configuration digests identify the rules and knowledge base that were applied: same digests and same target means the same analysis was applied. The evidence digest ties the report to the observation attached to it; it is not stable across runs, because sites change — which is exactly what makes it possible to prove that they did.
| engine | scanprivacy 0.1.3 |
| python | 3.12.16 |
| system | Linux 7.0.0-1019-azure (x86_64) |
| playwright | 1.62.0 |
| browser | Chromium 151.0.7922.34 |
| weasyprint | 70.0 |
| Ruleset digest | 2c1582a40adcaafd8d101cc04ba3123cdafa87a9fabd3b1b569fd37b6845209c |
| Knowledge base digest | abfd964d4f40580629ebf1eb4897906a76af05782e0b24ecfccc1e7f6a7d62bc |
| Evidence digest | c09a08748835f99d1d7f086cc61dd45beabe20375920203245da852c787c4abd |
pip install scanprivacy && scanprivacy install-browser
scanprivacy scan https://audiolibri.org --json evidence.json --md report.md --pdf report.pdf
scanprivacy verify evidence.json # recomputes every digest in this section
Each individual finding also carries the steps to check it with a browser and curl, without this tool.
Full evidence#
graph LR
n0(["audiolibri.org"])
n1["https://audiolibri.org/"]
n2["https://audiolibri.org/segnalazioni/"]
n3["https://audiolibri.org/chi-siamo/"]
n4[["audiolibri.org"]]
n5("audiolibri.org")
n6[["Cloudflare CDN / WAF"]]
n7[["GitHub Pages"]]
n8[("https://audiolibri.org/privacy.html")]
n9[("https://github.com/fabriziosalmi/audiolibri/blob/main/ACCESS")]
n10{{"No Content-Security-Policy"}}
n11>"gdpr:32"]
n12>"gdpr:25"]
n13["PM-SEC-03"]
n14{{"Technical provider outside the EEA: Cloudflare CDN / WAF (Cl"}}
n15>"gdpr:13.1.e"]
n16>"gdpr:28"]
n17>"gdpr:44"]
n18["declare_processor"]
n19{{"Technical provider outside the EEA: GitHub Pages (GitHub, In"}}
n20["declare_processor"]
n0 -->|publishes| n1
n0 -->|publishes| n2
n0 -->|publishes| n3
n1 -->|loads| n5
n2 -->|loads| n5
n3 -->|loads| n5
n5 -->|operated_by| n4
n0 -->|transfers_to| n6
n0 -->|transfers_to| n7
n0 -->|publishes| n8
n8 -->|declares| n6
n8 -->|declares| n7
n0 -->|publishes| n9
n9 -->|declares| n7
n0 -->|evidences| n10
n10 -->|violates| n11
n10 -->|violates| n12
n10 -->|fixed_by| n13
n6 -->|evidences| n14
n14 -->|violates| n15
n14 -->|violates| n16
n14 -->|violates| n17
n14 -->|fixed_by| n18
n7 -->|evidences| n19
n19 -->|violates| n15
n19 -->|violates| n16
n19 -->|violates| n17
n19 -->|fixed_by| n20
Method and limits#
- Method: only the public page indicated is loaded, with a headless browser
- Pages: at most 3 pages of the same site, chosen deterministically, one page load per second per host
- Interaction: none — no clicks, no form submissions, no authentication
- Consent: no choice is expressed: what the site does to a visitor who has not yet decided is what gets observed
- Extra requests: only the legal documents linked from the page, one per kind
- Intrusive tests: none — no fuzzing, no enumeration, no access to restricted areas
- robots.txt: honoured for every URL the engine requests
- User-Agent: scanprivacy/0.1 (+passive EU privacy conformance observation; independent research, good faith; contact: abuse@scanprivacy.org)
- Observation point: not recorded. Set SCANPRIVACY_VANTAGE to state where the scan was run from, or SCANPRIVACY_VANTAGE_LOOKUP to have it looked up. Neither is on by default: an engine that asks a third party where it is, on every scan, would be doing the thing this report is written to detect.
Stated limits. The observation covers a single page and a single visit: tools present elsewhere do not show up, and two consecutive loads may differ. No consent was expressed, so behaviour after acceptance is not verified. Art. 13 elements are recognised from the text: an unusual wording can escape detection, which is why documentary findings carry "indicated" confidence. The mapping to ISO, NIS2 and SOC 2 orients the work and does not attest conformity to those schemes.
Assessment carried out by observing only the traffic generated by the browser when loading public pages, with ordinarily available tools. Independent technical research conducted in good faith: it is not legal advice nor professional data protection consultancy.